Exploring change in geotechnomics

3.1 New players

Technology companies and their leaders are challenging the primacy of states as geopolitical actors. Big technology companies with global operations and interests in a web of technologies, consumer products, services, data, and digital infrastructure represent a new kind of international actor. They – and their billionaire CEOs – have emerged as major players in geopolitical arenas traditionally reserved for states, such as outer space.^Footnote12

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, for example, major companies including SpaceX and Microsoft – as well as small US-based AI startups, such as Primer.AI and Clearview AI – provided critical support to Ukraine. They did so on their own initiative, rather than under instructions from any government.^Footnote13

The rising geopolitical influence of big tech companies reflects their control of critical infrastructure and systems essential to economic and strategic power. Most communications infrastructure – including submarine cables, the data centres that form the cloud, and low earth orbit satellites – are in the private ownership of companies such as Google, Meta, Oracle, Microsoft, Amazon, SpaceX, and Huawei.^Footnote14

Strategic technologies are often dual-use, with implications for kinetic and non-kinetic warfare capabilities – including control over narratives. Cables running along the seafloor, for example, carry over 95% of all international internet traffic, including everything from private citizens’ data to intellectual property and military secrets. They are vulnerable to sabotage, data theft, and espionage.^Footnote15

The size and reach of leading tech companies – coupled with the potentially erratic influence of their enormously wealthy CEOs – represent a novel development on the world stage. Unlike firms such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which have long been part of military-industrial complexes largely controlled by governments, big tech actors are less dependent on government contracts. They may not prioritize state concerns, such as security, sustainability, and economic resilience. It can be difficult to untangle their motives.

Reflecting this new power, international organizations are inviting private corporations to provide policy recommendations to global leaders.^Footnote16 Some states have designated “tech ambassadors” to interface with them.^Footnote17 Questions are increasingly being raised about how these companies can be held accountable and integrated into global governance structures.

3.2 Rules

Multilateral institutions are struggling to regulate technology. As digital technologies with dual-use potential become more powerful, the task of regulating them becomes both more urgent and more difficult. Current international regulations are not always easy to apply,^Footnote18 and multilateral institutions have typically been limited to issuing statements or guidelines rather than new binding rules. Industry self-regulation efforts are proving inadequate. Regions and states are taking their own, often incompatible, approaches.

Regulations conceived in an analog age – for example, to protect privacy, security, and human rights in contexts of warfare or surveillance – often do not map clearly onto the dual-use affordances of new digital technologies.^Footnote19 Analog approaches that focus on constraining state actors, such as nuclear non-proliferation treaties, are not useful for new threats which can be deployed by a growing range of actors – for example, cyber-attacks, armed drones, and AI robots.^Footnote20

Governments and technology companies recognize the need to update standards and regulations – and some progress has been made, such as the International Criminal Court’s willingness to prosecute cyber-crimes.^Footnote21 However, multilateral institutions have so far largely been unable to broker agreements on new binding measures.^Footnote22 Few companies are willing to take unilateral measures that could threaten their competitive edge,^Footnote23 and industry self-regulation initiatives have been limited.

In the absence of more effective global leadership, conflicting values around innovation, profit maximization, human rights, and security are becoming embodied in approaches to technology regulation that differ across countries and regions. The EU, for example, is defining rights and principles in areas such as AI, social media, and disinformation.^Footnote24 The United States (US) favors a more hands-off approach.^Footnote25 China follows a politically driven strategy of limiting certain technologies and expanding others to uphold social control.^Footnote26

3.3 Sources of strength

Select smaller states with access to strategic natural and human resources increasingly enjoy outsized influence in the international system. The resources needed to develop cutting-edge technology – including critical minerals, manufacturing capability, capital, and talent – represent new sources of geopolitical power. As the world becomes more multipolar, new opportunities are opening for smaller states.

Critical minerals essential to frontier technologies are becoming more geo-strategically significant, in a similar way to gold and oil. Australia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among countries with rich reserves of critical minerals that have explored supply management on the OPEC model as a means of maximizing profits and power.^Footnote27

Manufacturing capability in technologies now considered strategic resources – including semiconductors, biotechnology, clean energy, and pharmaceuticals – is a growing source of power.^Footnote28 Beyond the US and China, regions with influence include Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, the Netherlands, and India. Capital-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are using their sovereign wealth funds to pioneer advanced technologies, such as Abu Dhabi’s open-source AI model, Falcon 40B.^Footnote29

The relative scarcity^Footnote30 of tech talent gives a competitive edge to countries with existing human capital or the ability to attract and retain skilled foreign workers. Canada’s immigration policy targets skilled workers, including technology talent.^Footnote31 Other notable examples of forward-thinking policies include Estonia’s Digital Nomad visa program, Singapore’s smart city initiatives, South Korea’s technology startup ecosystem, Switzerland and Sweden’s research facilities, and the UAE’s Future Office.^Footnote32

With increasing isolationism among established powers, there are more opportunities for small and middle powers to assert independence and leadership in a multipolar world order.^Footnote33 Examples include Turkey’s growing influence in defense, energy, humanitarian aid, and mediation, and South Africa’s role in advancing regional integration in Africa.^Footnote34 Middle powers, which thrived under the Western rules-based order, such as Australia and New Zealand, may be losing influence by comparison.

Emerging alliances – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the I2U2 group of India, Israel, the UAE, and the US – and expansion of existing alliances, such as BRICS and the G77, may also offer smaller states more geopolitical influence.To date, 36 countries have expressed an interest in joining BRICS, and the inclusion of oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran could fundamentally alter its internal dynamics and international behaviour.^Footnote35

3.4 Supply chains

Geopolitics and technology are reforging supply chains with heightened emphasis on reliability and security. Shocks such as COVID-19 made clear the vulnerabilities of lengthy supply chains that integrate lowest-cost suppliers from around the globe. Efforts towards de-risking and self-sufficiency – friendshoring, nearshoring, diversifying supply chains, and increasing use of technology – are leading to new geopolitical challenges for some and new economic opportunities for others.

In the post-Cold War era it was widely hoped that globalization of trade and the economic integration of China would secure global prosperity and stability.^Footnote37 However, recent events have exposed the vulnerabilities of long global supply chains: the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted manufacturing and logistics, the invasion of Ukraine disrupted raw materials and food supply chains, and climate change has also contributed to disruptions.^Footnote38

Dependencies on single sources under such circumstances have made supply chains tools of coercion in diplomatic disputes. At the same time, concern has been growing that outsourcing components of advanced technologies raises security-related risks such as espionage.

As a result, the concept of efficiency has been reassessed to place a premium on resilience and security, emphasizing partnerships with dependable and politically aligned actors. Rich countries, emerging powers, and multinationals seek to “derisk” their supply chains by creating networks of trusted allies, controlling critical technologies, or becoming more self-sufficient in strategic sectors.^Footnote39

In the semiconductor industry, for example, governments’ efforts to bolster domestic capacity include the 2022 US CHIPS and Science Act,^Footnote40 the European Chips Act, and significant investment by India and Japan.^Footnote41 In clean energy technology, which depends on minerals such as lithium and cobalt,^Footnote42 companies such as Tesla are pursuing vertical integration by acquiring suppliers.^Footnote43

Many supply chain challenges are being addressed through technologies. For instance, AI is optimizing inventory management and logistics.^Footnote44 Blockchain technology can ensure transparency and traceability, reducing the risk of counterfeit products.^Footnote45 IoT (Internet of Things) sensors that track the movement of goods provide real-time data, facilitating more informed decision-making.^Footnote46 3D printing enables more local and on-demand production, simplifying supply chains and reducing the need for large inventories.^Footnote47

Skepticism remains about the economic viability of efforts to build more resilient supply chains.^Footnote48 For example, Western attempts to reduce dependence on China^Footnote49 may benefit countries such as India, Vietnam, Thailand, and Mexico with ample labour supplies and favourable geographical locations.^Footnote50 However, when these trading partners are themselves extremely reliant on Chinese exports, the result can be a net increase in indirect imports from China to the West.^Footnote51

3.5 Inequality

Social and economic inequalities are deepening as the primary benefits of new technologies go to powerful individuals, groups, and states. The development and deployment of cutting-edge technologies, such as AI, is concentrating wealth and power in the hands of states, companies, and individuals that are already wealthy and powerful. AI also risks undermining democratic societies by enabling new forms of government control, worsening misinformation, and amplifying racial biases.

Technology development perpetuates global inequalities as it requires significant up-front investments from governments or the private sector, so it mostly happens in a few rich countries in the global north. Meanwhile, the labour-intensive, low-value tasks of data sorting and cleaning tend to occur in the global south.^Footnote52

Technology deployment likewise perpetuates unfair systems of extraction and control. A few private and state-backed enterprises control energy and communications infrastructure around the world. This allows them to extract direct profits from users. It also gives them access to data, which can be monetized or used to derive actionable insights about users. These firms have the power to manipulate or even shut down a country’s grid or communications network and to deny local rivals access to the systems that could make them viable competitors.

China encourages such behaviour by state-backed private enterprises to increase its soft power in strategically and economically important regions. This is especially notable in Africa,^Footnote53 where Huawei components comprise 70% of communication infrastructure such as 4G networks.^Footnote54

Private and state-owned surveillance systems can further enable control by making it easier for governments to identify and target critics. These systems allow them to search social media platforms for signs of dissent, implement more accurate and subtle methods of online censorship, and identify and monitor individuals participating in anti-government demonstrations.^Footnote55

AI is being used to subvert democratic norms and institutions in some states.^Footnote56 The rapid progress in AI-powered tools to generate text, audio, and imagery makes truth more challenging to identify and manipulation much easier.

New ethical challenges are also emerging with the potential of AI to exacerbate existing forms of discrimination and injustice.^Footnote57 Algorithmic decision-making in financial and medical contexts has been shown to have unintentional racial bias.^Footnote58 This could amplify antagonisms rooted in historical inequalities, with implications for domestic stability as well as foreign relations.

3.6 State and citizen

Notions of statehood and citizenship are evolving as technologies create new spaces for those with shared interests, values, and aspirations to connect. Technology has enabled people to interact and organize with like-minded others, both within their own countries and in other countries. As a result, new ideas are emerging – such as network states, digital nations, digital nomads, and global citizenship – that are challenging traditional notions of statehood and citizenship.

“Network states” are values-based, online communities that crowdfund the purchase of territory and hope to gain diplomatic recognition from an existing state. Thousands of members of Praxis, for example, have made financial investments with the aim of identifying a host country and becoming a Special Economic Zone.^Footnote59 Afropolitan hopes to build a society grounded in ancestral African mindsets, histories, and mythologies.^Footnote60

The idea of the “digital nation” is emerging as a means to protect citizens of countries that may disappear due to climate change. For example, Tuvalu – expected to be the first country to be submerged by rising sea levels – has asked the United Nations to recognize it as a digital state to preserve its fishing rights.^Footnote61

Traditional ideas of citizens’ rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis states are being challenged by the rise of “digital nomad” visas. Currently, over 50 countries allow foreigners to move and work remotely for up to 2 years.^Footnote62

Conventions around national citizenship are likewise evolving as immersive online spaces emerge as places to educate, engage, and deliberate on transnational priorities. They are expanding ideas of “global citizenship”, as well as opening space for groups to organize and express themselves in novel ways within states. In Canada, for example, an Anishinaabe-led consortium has developed Biskaabiiyaang (an Indigenous Metaverse) as a space to resist colonial systems and use storytelling to educate and reclaim ways of being.^Footnote63

4.1 International relations

• Governments may be expected to take a more active role in protecting national interests from big tech companies with the power to shape geopolitical conflicts
• Multilateral institutions may request additional support to create new mechanisms to regulate technology development and deployment
• Unregulated competition over new tech, new resources, and new arenas could exacerbate international tensions while harming the environment
• Global governance structures may enter a period of upheaval as they seek to integrate new players, spaces, and entities such as tech firms, metaverses, network states, and digital nations

4.2 Security

• Advanced communication technologies connect different facets of global society in ways that promote innovation and understanding, but also increase state vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, espionage, and system failures
• Building global capacity to overcome existential risks may prove impossible if rampant mis- and disinformation or ideological divides prevent consensus on ground truths
• Essential services could be jeopardized by foreign or unpredictable owners of critical internet infrastructure

4.3 Economics

• Countries may need to conduct a complex balancing act among their strategic interests, their core values, and their ability to remain globally competitive
• A less open and cooperative global trade environment may arise if international tensions, ideological movements, or attempts to secure supply chains drive the widespread adoption of protectionist industrial and trade policies
• Significant revision of global supply chains could also open doors to new markets for businesses based in states with advantageous geographic positions, skilled labour pools, and stable social conditions
• Inefficient allocation of resources, market distortions, and rent-seeking behavior among businesses may arise if governments take a more active role in prioritizing certain sectors and technologies
• As more jobs become automated, there may be increased international competition for skills that are both difficult to automate and traditionally undervalued – for example, those of care workers
• If disruptions to work become so frequent that workers struggle to meet their basic needs, some states may find their international position weakened by social disruptions or mass outmigration

4.4 Values and ethics

• A new source of international tension may emerge if global governance structures for emerging technologies that reflect human-centric, sustainable, and democratic values core to some states alienate key actors with different priorities and values
• Reliance on biased AI or data in future decision-making processes may lead to choices that perpetuate exclusion and undermine states’ social cohesion and economic potential
• Difficulties aligning values and ethics formulated for a physical world with the realities of emerging digital worlds may force decision-makers to rethink a range of assumptions around economic growth, immigration, social cohesion, intelligence gathering, democratic processes, and national security